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ABSTRACT 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a holistic approach to nation building that focuses on 
building strong police, military and justice systems that adhere to the rule of law and have 
a firm commitment to operating under democratically elected civilian governance.  The 
British effort in conducting SSR is, to date, the most comprehensive effort that has been 
conducted.  While UK and international involvement remains high in Sierra Leone, the 
security sector has operated independently since the removal of the last UN peacekeepers 
in late 2005.  In order to assess the effectiveness of the SSR programs, this paper 
compares the current capabilities of the Sierra Leone security sector with those it had in 
the 1970s, before the country began its slide into civil war.   
Overall, this thesis finds that the current state of the security sector is comparable 
to that of the 1970s, with some exceptions.  While the military has added the capability to 
participate in UN peacekeeping missions, overall the gains remain tentative and a lack of 
capacity is hampering the effectiveness of the police and justice sector, threatening the 
gains that have been made. These findings suggest that SSR, as conducted in Sierra 
Leone, has not been successful as envisioned and the results have been comparable to 
those of more traditional programs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, western governments have undertaken security sector 
reform programs (SSR) in post-conflict failed states, going beyond traditional post-
conflict reconstruction to attempt to strengthen states and democratic regimes in an effort 
to bolster long-term security.  SSR focuses on a wide range of security related projects, 
such as building institutions and security organizations that provide democratic control, 
public accountability, strong judicial systems, as well as vetting and training military and 
police forces that will focus on serving and protecting the public good.1  The United 
Kingdom’s (UK) Department for International Development (DFID) defines SSR as: 
The transformation of the security system which includes all the actors, 
their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated 
in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound 
principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning 
security framework. Responsible and accountable security forces reduce 
the risk of conflict, provide security for citizens and create the right 
environment for sustainable development. The overall objective of 
security sector reform is to contribute to a secure environment that is 
conducive to development.2  
SSR has become the preferred method for promoting security and development as a 
combined package, and is thus a centerpiece of U.S. and European aid programs in post-
                                                 
1 Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, "Security Sector Reform: Bringing the Private In." 
Conflict, Security & Development 6, no. 1, April 2006, 1–23; Louise Andersen, Post-Conflict Security 
Sector Reform and the Challenge of Ownership: The Case of Liberia. Danish Institute International 
Studies, 2006; Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh, Security-Sector Transformation in Post-Conflict Societies. 
Plymouth: International Studies Centre, University of Plymouth, 2002, 55; Stephanie Jean, "Security-
Sector Reform and Development: An African Perspective" Security Dialogue 36, no. 2 (2005): 249–253; 
David Law, "Conclusion: Security Sector (Re)Construction in Post-Conflict Settings," International 
Peacekeeping 13, no. 1 (March 2006), 111–123; Herbert Wulf, “Security Sector Reform in Developing and 
Transitional Countries,” in Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation, 
Edited by Clem McCartney, Martina Fischer and Oliver Wils. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for 
Constructive Conflict Management, 2004; J. Shola Omotola, "Beyond Transition: Challenges of Security 
Sector Reform and Reconstruction in Liberia," Journal of Security Sector Management 4, 4, November 
2006; James Dobbins, Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo. Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2008. 
 2 Quoted in Wulf, 3. 
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conflict societies.3  Evaluating its effectiveness is thus critically important to maximizing 
the efficiency of donor resources, and their benefits to post-conflict societies.   
The first SSR program was implemented by the UK in Sierra Leone, in support of 
a broader UN peacekeeping mission, in the aftermath of a decade long civil war in which 
state institutions, including the entire security sector, were destroyed.   The UK initially 
became involved in SSR in Sierra Leone following the 1996 elections, with a specific 
focus on police reform.4  However, the kidnapping of UN peacekeepers and the rebel 
threat to Freetown in 2000 resulted in the UK entering Sierra Leone with a large force, 
including a carrier strike group and amphibious ready group.  Following this intervention, 
the UK drastically increased its goals for SSR in Sierra Leone and began an intensive 
training program for the Sierra Leone military, along with institution building in the 
entire justice sector and Ministry of Defense (MOD).   
The UK worked with the UN, but not under its control.  Using a multi-agency 
approach, DFID coordinated with other UK and international agencies.5  As the vanguard 
of the UK intervention, a successful start at rebuilding the SLP and justice sector was 
important to show that SSR could be a viable approach to rebuilding war-torn states. A 
strong police force was necessary to maintain internal security and allow the armed 
forces to focus on external threats.  In this sector, more than with the Republic of Sierra 
Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), the UK took a multi-lateral approach using the UN, 
international donors, UNPOL and the Red Cross.  In addition to manning, training and 
equipping the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), UK and international efforts focused on 
developing “supporting mechanisms” such as a police charter and a strong judicial 
system to maintain the reforms and to create a stable, effective force.  To this end the UK, 
UN Development Program (UNDP) and Red Cross provided funds to build prisons and 
courts and train justices of the peace.  Additionally, DFID sponsored a Justice Sector 
                                                 
3 Daniel Bendix and Ruth Stanley, Security Sector Reform in Africa: The Practice and Promise of a 
New Donor Approach.  ACCORD. Occasional Paper Series: Volume 3, Number 2, 2008, 10. 
4 Osman Gbla, "Security Sector Reform Under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone." International 
Peacekeeping 13, no. 1 (March 2006), 81. 
5 Osman Gbla, Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (2007), 
24–25. 
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Development Program to promote access to legal services and protection to Sierra 
Leonean citizens, including funding per diem for justices to travel and provide services in 
the provinces.6  Also involved in legitimizing the police was the writing of a Police 
Charter and the formation of the Community Relations Department and Complaint, 
Investigations and Discipline Department to combat corruption and foster a sense of 
public confidence.7  
Defense sector reform, for both the MOD and RSLAF, became a priority during 
the British military intervention in 2000.  The International Military Advisory and 
Training Team (IMATT), comprised primarily of UK soldiers with contributions from 
other Commonwealth nations and advisors from several other countries, including the 
United States, was tasked with training the RSLAF.8  IMATT took over the role of the 
Short Term Training Teams (STTT) and had the tasks of: 
 Manning, training and equipping the Sierra Leone Army, Navy and Air 
Force.([These] tasks [were] done by both IMATT and UK units) 
 Structural and Institutional Reform of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces: 
Training organization, command structure, and other vital support 
structures. 
 Embedding in RSLAF units combating the RUF.9 
The UK also worked in conjunction with the UN to build civilian control, transparency 
and oversight of the SL-MOD, to provide funding, training and sponsored classes in 
Britain for civil servants.10 As part of this effort, all government agencies are now 
supposed to have transparent budgets, and both the police and MOD provide twice-
weekly press briefings.11  
                                                 
6 A. M. Fitz-Gerald, Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone. Shrivenham, GFN-SSR.  8–10. Osman 
Gbla. "Security Sector Reform Under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone.” 86–88. 
7 Gbla, Security Sector Reform in Sierra Reform. 27. 
8 Sierra Leone Country Assessment, Country Information & Policy Unit, Immigration & Nationality 
Directorate, United Kingdom Home Office. October 2001, 22. 
9 Jonathon P. Riley, “The U.K. in Sierra Leone: A Post-Conflict Operation Success?” Heritage 
Foundation, Heritage Lecture #958, 2006. Accessed at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Africa/hl958.cfm2006. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Gbla, "Security Sector Reform Under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone." 90. 
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Although the UK ended the military intervention in 2002, it has committed to 
providing approximately 100 active duty military trainers through 2010, along with 
continued support to the justice sector.12  The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) 
completed its mandate and withdrew at the end of 2005.13  With the withdrawal of the 
UN peacekeepers and the majority of the UK trainers, Sierra Leone became, and remains, 
the only nation to have completed such a comprehensive SSR program.  While British 
officials estimate that it will take “10 to 50 years of international involvement” to build a 
lasting framework of security and development in Sierra Leone, the removal of the UN 
peacekeepers and drawdown of the British trainers signify the end of intense international 
focus on building the security sector.14 With the SSR program roughly a decade old, how 
effective has it been to date in transforming the security system?  How does the current 
state of the security sector compare to its state in the pre-conflict years?   
While there is a growing body of research on SSR in general and in Sierra Leone 
in particular, much of it is impressionistic, lacking systematic analysis of empirical 
evidence.15  The literature is characterized by a debate, largely between international SSR 
implementers and Sierra Leonean academics.  Gbla and Fayemi argue that SSR was 
                                                 
12 James Dobbins, Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo; Andrew 
Dorman. 'The British Experience of Low-Intensity Conflict in Sierra Leone, Defense & Security Analysis 
23:2, 191;  “Sierra Leone-International Relations. Sierra Leone: Country Profile.” United Kingdom Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office. February 25, 2009. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-
profiles/sub-saharan-africa/sierra-leone/?profile=intRelations&pg=4 (accessed September 14, 2009); 
United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office. http://ukinsierraleone.fco.gov.uk/en/working-with-
sierra-leone-1/justice. (accessed September 15, 2009). 
13 United Nations (2008), Twenty-seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone. New York, New York: United Nations, 2008. 
14 David Keen, “Greedy Elites, Dwindling Resources, Alienated Youths, The Anatomy of Protracted 
Violence in Sierra Leone. International Politics and Society (February 2003). http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/ipg/ipg-2003-2/artkeen.pdf (accessed February 21, 2010). 
15 Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, "Security Sector Reform: Bringing the Private in.", 1–
23; Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, eds. Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, 
Jackson and Albrecht, eds. Birmingham, UK: GFN-SSR, February 2009; Louise Andersen. Post-Conflict 
Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Ownership: The Case of Liberia. Danish Institute 
International Studies, 2006 Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh. Security-Sector Transformation in Post-
Conflict Societies. Plymouth: International Studies Centre, University of Plymouth, 2002, 55; Stephanie 
Jean. "Security-Sector Reform And Development: An African Perspective" Security Dialogue 36, no. 2 
(2005): 249–253; David Law. "Conclusion: Security Sector (Re)Construction in Post-Conflict Settings," 
International Peacekeeping 13, no. 1, March 2006: 111–123.; Herbert Wulf. “Security Sector Reform in 
Developing and Transitional Countries; James Dobbins. Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the 
Balkans to the Congo.  
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weakened by being too donor driven, not encouraging sufficient Sierra Leonean 
ownership of its new security institutions or regional participation in reconstruction.16  
Albrecht and Jackson maintain that UK advisors played a dual role of both instilling local 
confidence in new recruits and insuring the political independence of the reformed 
security institutions.  In other words, foreign intervention was an enabler rather than an 
obstacle to local ownership of the security sector.17  
The debate also applies to specific achievements of SSR.  Dobbins credits it with 
effectively retraining the Sierra Leone military to assist UN peacekeepers deployed in the 
country, and he finds that the army has shown signs of increased professionalism and 
discipline.  As an example, he notes that infighting, which had been common in the army 
before SSR, had ceased by 2005.18  Albrecht and Jackson suggest that reform of the 
Ministry of Defense has improved civilian management of the RSLAF, and that the input 
of the RSLAF into the Defense White Paper shows effective cooperation between civilian 
and military managers.19  However, Gbla suggests that RSLAF training places too much 
emphasis on combat readiness and not enough on regaining the public’s trust, limiting 
progress on the SSR goal of building democratic governance. Fayemi contends that the 
large force size of the RSLAF, organization and equipment likely weakens both the 
performance of the military and democratic civilian control by placing unsustainable 
fiscal demands on the government.20   
There is very little research on police reform, although Kondeh and Gbla have 
argued that SSR programs have contributed to notable improvements in the police.  They 
credit the UK with taking the lead in producing a new police charter for Sierra Leone that 
                                                 
16 Gbla. Security Sector Reform in Sierra Reform. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007, 86–88; 
J. Kayode Fayemi. Governing Insecurity in Post-Conflict States: The Case of Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
Geneva: Centre for the Democratization of the Armed Forces, 2004: 23–27 
17 Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, 180. 
18 Dobbins, Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo.  
19 Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Jackson and Albrecht, eds. 
Birmingham, UK: GFN-SSR, February 2009: 145. 
20 J. Kode Fayemi, Governing Insecurity in Post-Conflict States: The Case of Sierra Leone and 
Liberia; Osman Gbla. Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone; Osman Gbla. "Security Sector Reform 
Under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone." 78–93; Jonathon P. Riley. “The U.K. in Sierra Leone: A 
Post-Conflict Operation Success?”  
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laid the groundwork for a police force that supports human rights and the rule of law, as 
well as recognizing the police for a training program that focuses on the same.21  The 
judicial sector is similarly understudied.  Research suggests only that efforts in the 
judicial sector have been less effective than with the police and military. Gbla, Fayemi 
and Albrech and Jackson agree that judicial reform has lagged other aspects of SSR, and 
has yet to be evaluated.22  
While the existing research provides some clues as to the effectiveness of SSR 
overall and its constituent parts, and Albrecht and Jackson make a comprehensive 
analysis of the various reform programs, there has been no effort to establish whether the 
security sector has now surpassed its pre-conflict capabilities. This thesis will begin to fill 
that gap.  It evaluates the change in capacity, capabilities and professionalism of the court 
system, police and military from pre-conflict to current levels.  Because SSR’s holistic 
approach to security is what sets it apart from traditional post-conflict security building, it 
is most appropriate to assess it with these broad measures.  The initial hypothesis is that 
SSR has been moderately successful in building a functioning security sector, and as a 
result the security sector in Sierra Leone is now more capable than it was in the pre-
conflict decades. 
The thesis uses a within case comparison across time to examine the effects of 
SSR programs on security sector institutions.  Police capabilities will be evaluated 
through their performance during the national elections of 2007 in comparison to their 
performance in the national elections of 1967.  Election security is a challenging task for 
police, and thus a good test of their capabilities. The withdrawal of UNAMSIL 
peacekeepers at the end of 2005 meant that the Sierra Leone police were charged with 
                                                 
21 Al Hassan Kondeh, “Sierra Leone,” in Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa, 
ed. Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin, 283–304. Geneva: DCAF, 2008; Osman Gbla, 
Security Sector Reform Under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone, 78–93 
22 Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Jackson and Albrecht, eds,131–135; 
Al Hassan Kondeh. “Sierra Leone,” in Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa, ed. Alan 
Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin, 283–304. Geneva: DCAF, 2008: 297; Nicole Ball, et 
al. Security and Justice Sector Reform Programming in Africa. London and Glasgow: DFID, 2007; J. Kode 
Fayemi, Governing Insecurity in Post-Conflict States: The Case of Sierra Leone and Liberia; Osman Gbla. 
"Security Sector Reform Under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone," 18; Osman Gbla, Security Sector 
Reform in Sierra Reform. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007, 28. 
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maintaining election security, with support from the RSLAF.  Additionally, the police 
will be accessed through their ability to conduct policing, such as crime control, anti-
smuggling and illegal mining.  These provide direct comparisons over time, as all three 
have been and remain serious issues in Sierra Leone. 
The military will be assessed based on its abilities to contribute to and participate 
in regional military exercises and peacekeeping deployments, defend territorial 
sovereignty, and its ability to provide support to the government and police as required.  
Foreign deployments would show that the government has confidence in the ability of the 
police to maintain domestic security in the absence of army units. Additionally, the 
ability to deploy in support of regional and international operations would help to show 
that the military has added this capability in comparison to the 1970s, when a paucity of 
UN peacekeeping missions meant that the military was not actively involved in 
international deployments. The military contributed to joint police-military operations 
against urban crime and smuggling in both periods, and these efforts will also be assessed 
and compared. In addition to the above, this paper will look for indications of military 
professionalism, such as firm commitment to civilian rule.  These lend direct 
comparisons to the activities of the military in the 1970s when numerous coups and coup 
attempts placed the army as a direct threat to civilian rule. How effectively does Sierra 
Leone conduct and prosecute investigations?  Are there significant amount of political 
interference in the justice sector, or are judges able to act within the rule of law?  Is 
access to the justice system available to all citizens, within a reasonable timeframe, or is 
there a large and growing backlog of cases? There is evidence of heavy political 
interference in the 1970s, leading to politically motivated imprisonments and trials, as 
well as an overall lack of court officials to prosecute criminal cases. If SSR has been 
effective, present day courts will have the judges, lawyers and court officials to prosecute 
cases in a reasonable timeframe and to assert their independence against political 
influence.   
If my hypothesis is correct, the performance of the security sector should be better 
now than in the pre-conflict period, given the lofty goals of SSR.  The analysis relies 
largely upon primary sources, including local media and international news 
 8
organizations, UN and foreign donor reports, such as Amnesty International and 
Transparency International for the current period and secondary sources for the pre-
conflict period.  Chapter II evaluates the effectiveness of the Sierra Leonean security 
sector in the 1970s.  Chapter III evaluates current state of the security sector.  Chapter IV 
undertakes a comparative analysis across time to evaluate the effectiveness of SSR in 
Sierra Leone, and discusses the implications for SSR projects elsewhere. 
 
 9
II. THE PRE-CONFLICT ERA 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In an attempt to provide a baseline from which to judge the improvement or lack 
thereof in the police, military, and judicial systems as a result of SSR this chapter 
evaluates the state of the Sierra Leone security sector in the 1970s, after the post-colonial 
security sector had settled into place but before the slide to war began in the 1980s.  It 
will show that the pre-war military was a glorified police force, largely due to a lack of 
foreign threats and peacekeeping deployments, which freely intervened in the political 
process.  The police had capacity problems in dealing with widespread crime and 
smuggling but were generally professional. Finally, the justice system also faced capacity 
shortfalls, as well as interference from an executive that sought, largely successfully, to 
limit its powers.  In the absence of SSR programs, the post-conflict security sector would 
likely have returned to this status quo anteat best.   
Britain founded Sierra Leone in 1787 as a colony for freed slaves. It named the 
capital Freetown and Krios, descendents of the returned slaves, coalesced into the 
colony’s elite.23  The country gained independence in 1961, remaining a member of the 
British Commonwealth until 1971 when it declared itself a republic.24  Two main 
political parties emerged in the transition to independent statehood, the All People’s 
Congress (APC) and the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP).25  These parties continue to 
dominate the political scene today.  The first Prime Minister, SLPP leader Sir Milton 
Margai, passed away in 1964 and was succeeded by his brother, Sir Albert Margai.26  
Albert Margai viewed himself as a progressive leader of a class of young professional 
                                                 
23 Michael Chege, "Sierra Leone: The State that Came Back from the Dead," Washington Quarterly 
25, no. 3 (2002): 148–149; Irving Kaplan, Area Handbook for Sierra Leone (Washington: U.S. GPO, 
1976), 18–19. 
24 Ibid., vii–viii. 
25 Fred M. Hayward, "Political Leadership, Power, and the State: Generalizations from the Case of 
Sierra Leone," African Studies Review 27, no. 3 (September 1984): 11. 
26 Arnold Hughes and Roy May, "The Politics of Succession in Black Africa," Third World Quarterly 
10, no. 1 (1988): 11. 
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Africans dedicated to state building, economic development and industrialization.27  
However, along with centralizing power, his tenure was marked by growing corruption 
and economic difficulties. In an ominous sign, by the mid-1960s the country had 
switched from a net-exporter to a net-importer of rice, one of its staple foods.28 Margai 
failed in his effort to make Sierra Leone a single-party state, and then lost the first post-
independence elections to the APC.29  Government attempts to muzzle opposition party 
newspapers and other media outlets in the run-up to the 1967 election were ruled illegal 
by the courts and APC candidates were subsequently able to campaign relatively freely.30  
Although the SLPP sought the backing of the military in the electoral process, the 
elections were basically free and fair.31 
The APC would remain in power until the onset of the civil war in the early 
1990s.  However, the period of its rule was characterized by threats of military intrusion 
into governmental affairs and an ongoing struggle by civilian governments to maintain 
supremacy over the military.  The military onslaught was immediate.  Brigadier David 
Lansana, Chief of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), staged a coup on March 21, 1967 in 
support of Margai and to prevent the APC President-elect Siaka Stevens from assuming 
power.  Lansana’s coup was reversed two days later by a counter-coup by a group of 
army and police officers, who formed a military government, the National Reformation 
Council (NRC), sending Stevens into exile in Guinea.32  The NRC remained in power for 
approximately one year, before being overthrown in a the third coup, this one led by 
enlisted soldiers, which facilitated Stevens accession as head of state with an APC 
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dominated government.33 The Stevens government was initially popular among both the 
masses and the educated elite.  However, this popularity faded as Stevens consolidated 
power by disrupting rivals and co-opting former SLPP officials.34  Stevens took a number 
of steps to insulate himself from threats military threats after coup attempts in 1970 and 
1971.  He signed a defense pact with neighboring Guinea, brought 200–300 Guinean 
soldiers to Freetown to serve as his personal guard, appointed Colonel Joseph Saidu 
Momoh, an ethnic Limba like himself, to command the army, and doubled spending on 
the military in an effort to buy loyalty.35  These tactics kept Sierra Leone coup-free for 
the next three decades. 
B. MILITARY   
 The primary mission of the SLA was to “protect the country from foreign 
encroachment,”36 but Sierra Leone faced no external threats.  In the colonial period, the 
SLA had been used largely for maintaining internal order,37 but also had performed well 
in the Second World War.  According to the commander of the 81st West African 
Division:  
The courage of the Sierra Leoneans was never doubted, but there was a 
natural speculation as to how they would be able to withstand so difficult 
an ordeal which had sorely tried some of the Empire’s most experienced 
troops. There need have been no speculation. From start to finish in the 
depths of the Arakan hill jungles, the Sierra Leone Regiment proved its 
worth, determined in defence, relentless in attack, always cheerful, 
individually brave, they bore themselves as veterans.38 
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The post-colonial SLA was very small, estimated at 1,360 in 1965.  With approximately 
.06% of the population under arms and 4.9% of the federal budget (1.3% of GNP) 
dedicated to the military, Sierra Leone was the least militarized West African country, 
after The Gambia, which had no army at all before 1981.39 
 While Sierra Leone did contribute troops to the 1961-1964 UN Operations in the 
Congo (ONUC) peacekeeping mission, the military still operated under largely under the 
leadership of British officers. 40  In May 1961, only 9 out of 54 officers were Sierra 
Leone nationals, transitioning to 54 out of 59 by January 1965.41 There were no external 
deployments after the transition was complete.  The absence of both external threats and 
international peacekeeping missions in the 1970s meant that the SLA did not have the 
opportunity to demonstrate capability and capability (or lack thereof) to conduct these 
missions, and so these cannot be assessed. 42  It was deployed to the southern borders in 
1971 to guard against incursions by pro-SLPP mercenaries. However, Kaplan suggests 
that this deployment, along with manning checkpoints and civil construction, was 
primarily a pretext for keeping the military busy and away from the capital after the coup 
attempts, rather than a response to a serious threat.43  Given this paucity of information, 
no assessment of the SLA’s capability to carry out its primary missions can be made. 
In practice, the primary role of the SLA in the 1970s was to support the police in 
suppressing internal dissent, securing the diamond mines, and patrolling the borders to 
control smuggling of diamonds and export crops.  The mines provided almost 70% of 
export earnings in 1970s, when official diamond exports peaked at over 2 million carats.  
By 1986, official exports dropped to 48,000 carats, as the vast majority of Sierra Leone’s 
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diamonds were smuggled across the borders.44  Illicit mining pits and transportation 
networks operated in public areas, such as buildings, airports and even a police station, 
indicating complicity of at least some military forces in smuggling, and ineffectiveness of 
the military overall in combating it.45  A small cadre of approximately 100 men with two 
gun boats was also trained to patrol the coast to battle fish poaching.46  Kaplan reports in 
1976 that the navy seemed to remain in a perpetual state of training, although it did 
conduct regular patrols.  With only 100 men and two 130 ton-patrol boats, the capability 
of the force would have been limited at best.47   
 The SLA’s performance in the 1967 elections was mixed.  On one hand, it 
provided limited, but professional support to the police in maintaining order.  For 
example, the government declared a state of emergency in Kono and the Western Area 
(Freetown and environs) districts in response to violent protests and called out the SLA to 
support the police.48  West Africa Weekly reports that armed soldiers joined the police to 
suppress the riots, making no mention of military/police violence or related deaths, 
despite “armed troops with guns at shooting position,” which suggests a measured and 
disciplined response.49  The following week’s edition notes that the riots had ended and 
the districts were calm in the lead up to the election.50  The Dove-Edwin Commission 
report on the elections explicitly credits the army with restrained and responsible 
behavior in responding to pre-election violence.  The report notes another instance in 
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which a detachment came under fire and suffered casualties while attempting to suppress 
violence between APC and SLPP supporters.  It did not return fire but demonstrated 
restraint and reported the matter to the police.51  On the other hand, military cohesion and 
professionalism were strained by the electoral exercise.  As noted above, directly 
following the election the Lansana, NRC and “privates” coups demonstrated serious 
internal divisions and a lack of respect for both military hierarchy and the civil-military 
divide.   
Overall, SLA capabilities in the 1970s were limited.  The force was significantly 
politicized and largely ineffective.  When the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels 
invaded from Liberia in 1991, the SLA offered no significant resistance.    
C. POLICE 
 The Sierra Leone police (SLP) were modeled after the British, were founded in 
1829 with an initial cadre of 26 appointed to patrol Freetown.52  The size of the force 
grew gradually and its duties expanded.  By the late 1940s, the force numbered roughly 
1,000 and all police responsibilities had been extended into the countryside to replace 
court messenger forces.  The first police training school was founded by Police 
Commissioner Brook in 1909 and was moved to Hastings in 1948.53  At independence 
the police were well organized and had a set organizational structure that included ties to 
Interpol.54  In addition to standard policing, their responsibilities included controlling 
smuggling and illegal mining.  In 1975, the police to population ratio was 1:674, much 
higher than Ivory Coast (1:1790) or Nigeria (1:1833), but lower than Guinea (1:434).55   
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 SLP performance in the core mission areas of criminal policing and maintenance 
of law and order was mixed.  On one hand, several researchers rate the SLP as one of the 
best on the continent in the 1970s.  According to Kaplan, the police force was respected, 
apolitical, and its “membership was a microcosm of the various ethnic, religious, and 
political divisions in the country.”56  Kaplan suggests that regular contact between the 
police and members of the community promoted good police-civilian relations.57  Bebler 
concludes that the police were “less-faction ridden and [had] better leadership” than the 
military. On the other hand, their effectiveness in combating crime was limited.  The 
deployment throughout the 1970s of a joint army-police unit to assist the police against 
smugglers and for fighting crime in urban areas indicates the ineffectiveness of regular 
police units.58  Smuggling might be seen as a problem inherently requiring the 
application of police and military capabilities, but urban crime certainly is not.  While 
Sierra Leone did not keep crime statistics, violent crime was prevalent enough that in 
1971 the government passed a law imposing the death penalty for any violent crime.59  
While a precise assessment is impossible, there is circumstantial evidence, such as 
statements by Stevens and the passing into law of the death penalty for those convicted of 
violent crimes, that violent crime and gang activity were on the rise.60 The government 
generally used the army or other specialized units, such as the Internal Security Unit 
(ISU) or General Services Unit (GSU) rather than the police against demonstrators, but 
this is likely because those units were specifically formed for regime support.61    
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The 1967 elections are a good opportunity to assess police performance, since 
election security necessarily involved a large number of police.  As noted above, the 
army was occasionally called upon to assist the police in suppressing riots, suggesting 
that the police did not have the capability to handle serious incidents of internal unrest 
without support.  However, there were no reports of undue violence aimed at the 
protesters, which also suggests that the police reacted in a professional manner.62  
Hayward claims that the state of emergency was declared by Margai in an attempt to 
influence the election in his favor.  Although not mentioned in the other reports, if this is 
true it may suggest again that police were too professional rather than too weak to 
conduct the desired operations.63  The Dove-Edwin Commission recognized the police 
for ensuring registered voters were allowed to vote in areas where APC supporters 
attempted to prevent them from doing so.  Additionally, police are credited for preserving 
the peace and ensure smooth voting in Kono district, where electoral violence had been 
feared.  These positives are tempered by incidents of police interference in the election, 
including a alleged mishandling of ballot papers, which was reported to the police but not 
investigated, police involvement in the beating of one of Margai’s security officers, and 
“unnecessarily delayed disturbances in which the Police took part.”64  Overall the 
elections were peaceful, with violence limited to the areas mentioned above, and there 
was no evidence of police lending support to either party.65 While the police 
commissioner threw his support behind the NRC after the 1967 coup, the rest of the 
police force remained neutral.66     
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 SLP efforts to halt smuggling were largely ineffective, even when combined with 
the SLA support.  As noted above, illegal mining and smuggling of diamonds were a 
growing issue for the country and the police, and the illegal activity cut across all 
governments successively in turn, each proving that they were unable to halt or slow its 
growth.67 Although police and army officers alike were involved in illegal diamond 
smuggling operations granted by Stevens as patronage, their failure to implement official 
policy nevertheless demonstrates a lack of capability and/or professionalism.68   
 Overall, police performance can be assessed as marginal.  The police displayed a 
lack of politicalization, especially compared to the military, during the 1967 elections, 
and except for the Commissioner did not involve themselves in the followings coups.  
The formation of the ISU and GSU can be seen as government attempts to politicize the 
police forces. The SLP lacked the capability to combat either crime or rampant 
smuggling and illegal mining, and required military support to supplement their efforts.  
D. JUDICIAL SYSTEM/COURTS 
Like other elements of the security sector, the Sierra Leone court system was 
based on Anglophone traditions and English law.  At independence, as part of the 
Commonwealth, the country had five or six levels of courts (depending on location), with 
the highest judicial body being the Privy Council of the House of Lords in London. In 
1971, upon leaving the Commonwealth, the Sierra Leone Supreme Court became the 
nation’s highest court.69  In 1973, the country only had 55 lawyers registered with the 
bar, divided into two classes, as in the United Kingdom, with only barristers allowed to 
plead cases. The exact number of barristers is not known, but by definition it was less 
than 55.  This lack of capability was in some respects compensated for by a heavy 
reliance on lower and customary courts for many petty offences.70 The judicial system is 
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even less well documented than the SLA and police, but there is sufficient information to 
provide a basic analysis of the effectiveness and independence of the courts in the 1970s.  
The constitution of 1971 created a quasi-independent “judicial service 
commission” charged with appointing magistrates and court officials but not judges, 
which were to be appointed by the President.71  Thus, the court was nominally 
independent, but open to political interference through the appointment process.  The 
courts set an early precedent of judicial independence in the lead-up to the 1967 
elections, ruling in favor of APC legal challenges to SLPP party and government attempts 
to file libel claims, curtail free speech, and close down its newspaper.72  However, once 
demonstrated this independence was quickly reduced.  Margai responded by dismissing 
the Chief Justice and replacing him with a political ally, Gershon Collier.73  This trend 
was continued by Stevens, and by the middle of the1970s the courts had been brought 
substantially to heel, although the judiciary strove to maintain independence where 
possible. The lower court judges were the most compromised.  Lawyers who dealt with 
the courts in the 1970s reported that unless a case against APC interests was taken to the 
Appeals Court or the Supreme Court, in which a panel of judges could better resist 
political pressure, it was difficult to win.74  Nevertheless, the courts either dropped cases 
or acquitted many defendants charged by the government, including those charged in the 
1967 coup, suggesting a concerted effort to maintain independence.  Amnesty 
International reports covering 1974–1977 list instances of judicial abuse, alongside fair 
and public trials.75  For example, the 1974/75 report praises the public trial with defense 
lawyers of 15 individuals accused on treason, and acknowledges that they had access to 
an appeals court to fight their death sentence. The absence of criticism of the proceedings 
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and guilty verdict suggest that the process was perceived to have been conducted fairly. 
Kaplan asserts that the “internment and trial, even though the cases involved sensitive 
political matters, had been scrupulously correct.”76  However, in the same report AI lists 
80 individuals detained after a bombing and notes that the status of several of them 
remained unknown.77  While the prisoners were arrested during a state of emergency and 
so were legally held without trial, the lack of accountability in the system indicates a lack 
of judicial capability.  The 1977 AI report claims, “about 500 political prisoners were 
being held, 90% of whom had not been tried.”78 The fact that the judicial system was 
unable or unwilling to process these cases indicates significant interference in its 
proceedings and/or lack of capability.  Overall, the court system lacked capability to 
prosecute cases and was politically compromised, although it strived to maintain judicial 
independence.  
E.  CONCLUSION 
 The military’s ability to conduct any operations other than internal assistance to 
the police cannot be accessed, although it generally performed well in support to civil 
authorities. The police strived to maintain independence from political interference, and 
in the turmoil surrounding the 1967 elections and following coups, largely succeeded. 
However, the fact that the military was continually used as support for the police in 
maintaining order, suggests limited police capability and speaks against the claims that it 
was a strongly performing force.   Similarly, the courts lacked the capability or will to 
processes those charged and held.  In addition, by the mid-1970s the police, army and 
courts, all worked for the APC.  Thus, Sierra Leone’s security sector in the 1970s 
demonstrated, at best, basic levels of capability and very limited insulation from political 
interference in pre-civil war era. 
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III. THE POST-CONFLICT ERA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter assesses the current state of the military, police and justice sector.  
As in the previous chapter, it will consider the military’s ability to conduct operations, its 
conduct during the 2007 election and its police support activities.  Police will be 
evaluated in terms of their ability to maintain laws and order, deter crime and smuggling, 
and maintain election security.  Finally, the justice sector will be examined for signs of 
judicial independence, capability and capacity. 
Sierra Leone began sliding toward war in the mid-1980s.  The war finally broke 
out in 1991, when the RUF, led by former Corporal Foday Sankoh, invaded from Liberia.  
Some hoped the war would be brought to an end after the democratic election of Alhaji 
Kabbah (SLPP) in 1996.  However, LT Col Johnny Paul Koroma overthrew Kabbah in 
1997, establishing the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and allying with 
the RUF.79  The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) immediately 
intervened with troops, restoring Kabbah to power.  However, ECOWAS Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) forces were unable to drive the rebel forces from their enclaves, from 
which they continued to conduct raids and attacks.80  In 1999, a peace agreement, the 
Lomé Accords, was brokered and its implementation subsequently supported by 
UNAMSIL, which replaced departing ECOMOG forces with over 15,000 UN 
peacekeepers, the largest peacekeeping force in the world at the time. 81  The Lomé 
Accords made Sankoh Vice-President and Minister of Natural Resources, which gave 
                                                 
79 "SIERRA LEONE/KOROMA," GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2000/05/000514-sierra1.htm (accessed February 11, 
2010). 
80 Paul Williams, "Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone." 
Contemporary Security Policy 22, no. 3, 2001: 147; Peter A. Dumbuya, "ECOWAS Military Intervention 
in Sierra Leone: Anglophone-Francophone Bipolarity or Multipolarity?" Journal of Third World Studies 
25, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 97; Osman Gbla. "Security Sector Reform Under International Tutelage in Sierra 
Leone," International Peacekeeping 13, no. 1, March 2006: 80. 
81 Adedeji Ebo, The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia, 
7. 
 22
him de facto control of the diamond fields, and gave blanket amnesty for all war crimes 
and human rights abuses to all involved in the war.82  UNAMSIL declared the war over 
in January 2002, oversaw elections later that year, and completed a staged withdrawal of 
its forces in December 2005.83 
B. MILITARY 
Military expenditures were roughly $40 million annually (2% of GDP) in 2006-
2008.84  This figure is significantly higher than for other countries in the region.  For 
example, Liberia’s average was approximately .5%, Ghana’s .75% and Côte d’Ivoire’s 
1.55%, reflecting the large size of the RSLAF, second only to Nigeria.85  Despite the 
large budget, the quality of life for soldiers is poor.  The government of Sierra Leone and 
leadership of the RSLAF have a goal of reducing the force from 10,000 to 8,500 by the 
end of 2010 (primarily through retirement and natural attrition), and to reduce the number 
of housing, barracks and other facilities, reducing costs to the state and enabling the it to 
improve living conditions for the remaining force. 86   However, Jane’s estimates that the 
RSLAF still musters over 10,000 soldiers.87  This suggests that the ability of the military 
to conduct internal reforms is limited.   
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 While Sierra Leone has historically good relations with its neighbors, during the 
civil war border incursions occurred on all sides.  Currently, the UN Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL), with over 10,000 peacekeepers helps to maintain security on the Sierra Leone-
Liberian border.88  However, Guinean troops still occupy several border areas, the most 
contentious being the area surrounding the village of Yenga. In 2004, Guinean President 
Conte disavowed Guinean claims over the territory, but the country still occupies the 
area.  Authorities estimate that there is little threat of conflict breaking out and there have 
been no reports of skirmishes or standoffs between the two militaries.89  While the threat 
of conflict is low, the ability of the RSLAF to defend the border in such an instance is 
low and would likely be overmatched by the more heavily armed Guinean forces.90 
 The RSLAF deployed 160 soldiers to Darfur, as part of the UN-African Union 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in February 2010, its first UN peacekeeping deployment 
since ONUC in the early 1960s.91  Sierra Leone did provide roughly 350 troops and 
staging bases for ECOMOG’s Liberian intervention in 1990, but due to lack of command 
and control and logistics capabilities.  The Sierra Leone continent had exceedingly poor 
leadership, with its commander, Lt. Colonel Modu Hanciles, being relieved of his job in 
late-1990 for “cowardice and neglect of duty.”92  To deploy with UNAMID, the RSLAF 
was required to meet standards of training and pass UN assessments that certify it for 
peacekeeping operations, as laid out by UN resolution A/RES/49/37 and the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations.  These requirements include training in meeting the specific 
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rules of engagement specified by the UN for the specific operation, rule of law, human 
rights, core UN peacekeeping standards and goals, and other basic training standards that 
validate the RSLAF’s ability to conduct peacekeeping operations in conjunction with 
other UN forces.93  The level of capacity that the UN mandates is not a certification to 
conduct military operations, and while the UN provides training teams the majority of a 
contributor’s training and standards are determined internally.  In the case of Sierra 
Leone the deployment signifies both a new capability for the RSLAF and an international 
understanding of the maturation of the military.  Despite those positives, the deployment 
to the UN should not be taken as a sign of a completely self-sufficient and highly capable 
force.  Without the continued support of IMATT and its provision of specific training and 
vehicles the RSLAF would likely not have been able to deploy. However, the 
government has expressed interest in deploying a full battalion to Darfur if the first 
deployment is successful, which bodes well for continuing efforts to maintain and extend 
the appropriate capabilities.94 
 As a member of ECOWAS, the RSLAF is also a contributor to the ECOWAS 
Standby Force (ESF) and has committed to providing a company sized infantry unit to 
the brigade.  It has been chosen, along with Mali, to host one of two logistics centers that 
will maintain stockpiles of equipment in preparation for use in ESF operations.95  While 
the specific selection criteria have not been published, the selection of Sierra Leone 
suggests that ECOWAS has confidence in the RSLAF’s ability to maintain control of 
dangerous material.  The RSLAF participated in ECOMOG/ESF Endeavour 
Interoperability Exercise in July 2008.  Sponsored by the U.S. military, the African  
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Union and ECOWAS, Endeavour was geared towards improving command and control 
and communications among states participating in the ESF.96  This exercise included all 
15 members of ECOWAS.97  
 RSLAF assistance to civil authorities is delineated under the Military Aid to Civil 
Power (MACP) policy formulated by the Office of National Security (ONS) in 2004.  
The ONS is the central agency responsible for coordinating security and intelligence 
issues and organizations and was the primary agency responsible for coordinating 
security during the 2007 elections.98 MACP divides RSLAF assistance to the SLP into 
two types: “standing tasks” and “emergency tasks.”  A standing task is one the National 
Security Council (NSC) assigns to the RSLAF as a “defined operation” to assist civil 
authorities for an indefinite period until an NSC determination that military support is no 
longer needed.  An emergency task is a specific request, assigned only when the SLP is 
unable to cope without assistance.99 Under the MACP, the RSLAF performed well in 
support of civil authorities during the 2007 elections, deploying several hundred military 
police, upon request of the Inspector General of the Police, in support to the SLP.100   
These troops patrolled with police in specific high-threat areas, such as ports of 
Freetown, and had a stabilizing effect.101  The elections were free and fair, representing a 
great stride forward for the country, and for the security forces in general.102  While the 
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RSLAF played only a supporting role to the SLP, its willingness and ability to play such 
a role is an indicator of some level of professionalism and capability.    
 However, disillusionment and politicization within the armed forces is clearly a 
problem, though it is impossible to determine how big of one.  A January 2009 open 
letter to President Koroma from a group of RSLAF officers and soldiers calling 
themselves the Detective Reconnaissance Emergency Action Mission Team, or DREAM 
Team, accuses the Minister of Defense and President of favoritism and tribalism in the 
promotion and training of officers and “reckless neglect of the welfare of soldiers.”103  
The DREAM Team claims to be “a network of over 850 officers and men in all bases of 
the Sierra Leone Armed Forces cutting across tribal and political party lines [standing] 
for justice and order … [and] committed to checking … injustice and the excessive 
misrule that led to the bloody rebel war in Sierra Leone.”104  The group asks for a 
political solution, but warns that if all else fails it will take matters into its own hands. 105  
This letter is obviously disturbing, especially if the group includes anywhere near as 
many RSLAF members as it claims.  With Sierra Leone’s history of coups and ethnic 
favoritism, these threats have to be taken seriously.106 However, there have been no 
reports of subsequent action taken either against or by the “DREAM Team,” so it is 
difficult to determine just how serious the problems identified actually are.  Jane’s 2009 
assessment rates Sierra Leone a 3 out of 9 on state control of the military (with 9 being 
the highest rating), with an overall military stability rating of 31/100, among the lowest in 
the region.  This data suggests that although the military was able to maintain its 
professionalism during and after the elections, widespread threats of politicization of the 
force still exist.107    
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In October 2009, the RSLAF was called upon to assist police in dealing with 
violent crime in the capital and provincial towns and at the Bumbuna Hydroelectric 
project.108  The military assistance has had a positive impact on security, although 
incidents of armed robbery and murder persist.109  There have been no reports of the 
military using undue force, and all accounts refer to joint police-military patrols, 
suggesting that the RSLAF is working within the confines of the MACP program, 
playing a supporting role to the police and civil authorities, and capable of supporting law 
enforcement efforts, as well as more martial support missions, such as riot-suppression. 
The RSLAF Maritime Wing, hereafter referred to as the navy, was subsumed as a 
branch of the RSLAF in 2002 and now operates as a branch of the military, rather than an 
independent service.110  It received three 32-foot cutters from the United States in 2006 
and ten fast attack craft and a patrol boat from China in 2006 and 2008, respectively, 
bringing its fleet up to 14 operational patrol craft from zero.  According to Jane’s, the 
Sierra Leone navy is “considerably effective” in combating piracy, smuggling and illegal 
fishing in its territorial waters, with the craft donated by China having had a considerable 
impact on increasing its capability to deal with piracy and smuggling.111  This is 
particularly impressive for a force that only became operational in 2006.  In February 
2007, in its first action since before the civil war, the navy apprehended a Chinese fishing 
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trawler, after firing warning shots when the vessel refused to stop.112  According to press 
reports and Jane’s, the navy has been consistently patrolling territorial waters, and there 
are numerous other instances of apprehensions of illegal fishermen and fuel smugglers 
over the last three years.113  In September 2009 the navy responded to the site of a 
sinking ferry and assisted in the rescue and recovery of several dozen survivors and at 
least 150 corpses from the stricken vessel.114  Although some families of the victims 
criticized the slowness of the response, the navy’s actions appear to have been more 
responsive and effective in rescue and recovery efforts than its counterparts in Cameroon 
(2006) and Senegal (2002). However, while the Sierra Leone navy responded more 
rapidly than its counterparts in the region, the delay between sinking and the arrival of 
rescue vessels demonstrates that the navy still suffers from a lack of capability or training 
to be able to rapidly respond to disasters at sea.  In the September 2002 Senegalese ferry 
accident, over 1,800 lives were lost, including 22 French nationals.115  The French 
government filed international arrest warrants against Senegalese leaders and military 
officials for incompetence in mounting rescue efforts.116  Given that the Sierra Leone 
navy has only 270 personnel, 14 patrol boats, one main base and 4 forward operating 
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bases for 250 miles of coastline, its response seems to have been adequate.  Overall, the 
accomplishments for the navy are impressive, especially given that it has been 
operational for only three years.117   
 Despite its successes, the RSLAF continues to be plagued by corruption and 
criminality.  The police seizure of a military truck carrying smuggled goods in September 
2008 demonstrates that RSLAF successes in this realm have to be balanced against its 
direct participation in smuggling.118  A courtroom riot led by the RSLAF officer on trial 
and assisted by another commissioned officer and several enlisted men in July 2007 
similarly demonstrates a lack of respect for the rule of law among individual officers. 
While the incidence of such behaviors is impossible to determine, combined with the 
disgruntlement expressed in the DREAM Team letter they suggest that systemic 
problems remain.119  
 Successful completion of UN training and certification, along with deployment to 
UNAMID, is a very big step for the RSLAF, as is its integration into the ESF.  The 
successes of the navy show that the military is capable of taking on larger, more technical 
tasking. However, the DREAM Team letter, substandard barracks and housing 
conditions, and corruption and criminality demonstrate continuing weaknesses. 
Politicians’ efforts to promote ethnic bias and/or politicize the military would pave the 
way for a return to the tense civil-military relations of decades past.  Even the perception 
of such actions is enough to seriously undermine the performance and professionalism of  
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the RSLAF.  Finally, it is not at all clear how well the RSLAF would respond to threats 
along its borders, and thus its ability to perform its core mission remains a big question 
mark.120   
C. POLICE 
The police remain largely unable to carry out their core mission—crime control.   
In 2006, President Kabbah announced: "Police are finding it more and more difficult, due 
to capacity problems, to bring culprits to book, and to stem the tide of crime and violent 
conduct."121 Rates of burglary and theft in the capital are very high, exacerbated by a 
shortage of police and staff, low pay, which encourages corruption, and lack of respect 
among the population, which limits police investigations.  Complaints about SLP 
corruption and ineffectiveness are widespread.122 Amnesty International documents poor 
prison conditions and overcrowding in police stations, as well as instances of police 
beatings of prisoners, resulting in several deaths.  It also documents police beatings of 
eight reporters covering SLPP and APC political meetings in 2009.123  On the bright side, 
there is no evidence of politicization within the police.  The journalists were beaten while 
covering both political parties, suggesting that the police are apolitical but suffer from a 
lack of discipline and respect for the law. The police have instituted community outreach 
programs, such as non-violence workshops and a youth community-policing program, in 
attempts to address the crime and violence throughout the country.124  The Acting 
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Inspector General of Police hopes that the community policing programs will enable the 
police to release the RSLAF from their assistance under the MACP.125 
 However, the community outreach programs are showing little success.  Police 
participation in local police partnership boards is sporadic and inattentive to local 
concerns and issues. In many areas, including parts of Freetown, the community relies on 
local youth to provide security patrols and for protection, independently of the police, 
again demonstrating the virtual absence of police capability.126  The head of a local youth 
organization describes these informal policing efforts in one rural community: 
There is not much crime here because this township is like a family. We 
know everybody and everything. If there is a fight they go to the youth 
group or after them the chiefs; only finally do they go to the police. There 
is no police post in the community of Yengema . . . We have a youth 
security network. We patrol at night. We respond if there is a problem. We 
harass anybody who brings drugs. We arrest them, destroy the drugs; we 
give them a beating. Solved! No more drugs!127 
The reliance on this informal structure, while it may be effective within individual 
communities, may very well block the development of a strong police force and the rule 
of law.  It is also a further indicator of a lack of police reach and capability to deal with 
crime and other urban issues. 
 The formal police-youth community-policing program, begun in December 2009, 
will recruit 9,000 volunteers over the age of 18 to supplement police patrols in the 
capital, without police powers.  This program is viewed as a way to respond to youth 
unemployment (estimated at 60%) and gang and criminal activity, while extending 
community policing.128  The ‘volunteers’ are to be paid a stipend, will wear a uniform 
that differentiates them from the police and will not be allowed to carry “offensive” 
weapons.  Vetting is to be done in cooperation with community elders to identify the best 
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candidates.129  Nevertheless, some citizens are concerned that participants will use their 
positions to facilitate rather than prevent criminal activity and violence.130 If this program 
is administered well, it may achieve both of its goals and increase SLP credibility with 
the local population on the margins.  However, if the volunteers are involved in bribery 
and crime, the opposite result is likely. 
Political riots in Freetown in March 2009, led by SLPP and APC supporters, 
provided the largest challenge to the SLP since the 2007 elections (discussed below), and 
again revealed a lack of capacity.  The police were unable to properly control the crowd 
and protect civilians in the course of the mayhem.131  The UN responded to the lack of 
police capacity by providing riot control equipment as well as training in crowd control 
procedures.132  Although ineffective, the police behaved professionally, apolitically and 
generally without undue violence.  The one notable exception was the firing of dispersal 
shots into a crowd resulting in several deaths, after tear gas failed to dispel protesters.133   
Accusations of rape against APC supporters were investigated and medical examinations 
done before the charges were dismissed for lack of evidence.  This dispensation was 
supported by a subsequent independent investigation.  This incident nevertheless is 
generally seen as evidence of systemic ineffectiveness.134 
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The SLP has been actively involved in combating drug smuggling in the country 
and has made several major seizures and arrests. One seizure in 2008 led to a police 
investigation, arrest of several foreign nationals and several dozen citizens, and the firing 
of the Transportation and Aviation Minister, who was implicated in the smuggling.135  
While impressive in their own right, these incidents are more of an exception than an 
indicator of ability to contain smuggling and drug trafficking on a daily basis. The SLP 
have not been successful at combating illegal mining and smuggling of diamonds. While 
legal exports of diamonds have risen over the last decade, reaching approximately $141 
million dollars in 2007, from the 3% royalty that diamond exporters pay to the 
government (approximately $4.25 million) only $25,000 to $50,000 is spent on mine 
monitoring and the police Precious Minerals Monitoring Team.136  The police have 
arrested diamond smugglers and attempted to gain better control over the diamond trade, 
but it is estimated that illicit diamond exports are 100% to 400% of official exports. The 
Peace Diamond Alliance in 2005 estimated production at $400 million, but government 
figures only recorded $142 million in exports.  The International Crisis Group (ICG) has 
a much lower production estimate of $200 million.137  These figures suggest that while 
the police have made some notable arrests of smugglers, overall they have been 
ineffective at limiting the illegal flow of goods. 
The SLP has a roughly 60-person contingent participating in UNAMID.138  It was 
provided pre-deployment training by the UN focusing on human rights, refugees, human 
trafficking, sexual exploitation, HIV/AIDS and security issues as required by the UN 
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Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UN resolution A/RES/49/37.139  
This deployment suggests that the SLP, or at least one small unit of it, is developing some 
basic peacekeeping capabilities.   
 The national elections of 2007 were a major test of the capabilities and 
professionalism of the SLP.  International observers rated the elections a qualified 
success. SLP was responsible for providing security for all aspects of the election, 
including NEC offices, campaigns, polling places and for counting and announcing of 
results.140   A November 2006 UN assessment concluded: 
The national security sector is generally functioning well.  The capacity of 
the Sierra Leone Police to maintain law and order and discharge its 
security responsibilities continues to develop. Progress made in enhancing 
the capacity of the security sector is encouraging.   
However, there is still a need to further strengthen and rationalize the 
security architecture of Sierra Leone, so that both the Sierra Leone Police 
and the Armed Forces could be sustainable in the long term, and also carry 
out their tasks effectively, in particular in connection with the 2007 
elections. 141 
 The National Electoral Commission (NEC) worked with the Office of National 
Security (ONS) to coordinate between the various security agencies (SLP, RSLAF and 
private security firms), and gave the SLP credit for the core of the work.142   During the 
pre-election campaigning, the police were called upon to respond to interparty violence 
and performed adequately.  In one instance, the police successfully broke up an APC-
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SLPP standoff in the capital that had disrupted the city for several days.143  It was a 
positive sign that the SLP could handle the majority of the security requirements.  
Although RSLAF provided assistance for patrolling Freetown and other high-threat areas, 
it remained a supporting role. 144  It responded to incidents of violence, such as post-
election riots at the SLPP headquarters, during which tear gas was fired into the crowd, 
breaking up the demonstration and enabling besieged SLPP supporters to escape the 
area.145   
The SLP was hampered somewhat by high-level political interference.  “Senior 
Police Officers who chose to strongly collaborate with NEC to ensure transparent, free 
and fair elections were constantly transferred to prevent them from playing a professional 
role while others were threatened with demotion.”146  In addition, both political parties 
used young ex-combatants to support their campaign efforts, and maintaining control 
over them was a major concern for the SLP. Some of the youth who worked as 
“securities” for the parties reported that they did so to evade arrest by the police for their 
criminal activities.  This suggests that the police were effective in maintaining law and 
order—among those without political protection.  Both parties pressured police for the 
release of supporters arrested in violent demonstrations and criminal activity.147  
Although at times this did lead to the release of political party supporters, both UN and 
the NEC reports state that overall police were largely able to resist this pressure.148  
 According to the NEC, “the SLP maintained its professional integrity and 
supported the NEC at all costs. … [T]he SLP have been particularly outstanding for their 
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distinguished display of professionalism amidst attempts of political interference and 
bribery.”149  The Amnesty International 2008 report also notes few violations in elections 
that were held largely according to national laws and international standards.150  Thus, 
the 2007 election stands out as the SLP’s brightest moment to date.  Indeed, for one voter 
it was a major turning point. Although concerned about violence, Mari-ama Koroma went 
to the polls on election day to register her vote.  Upon arrival she found a calm orderly 
scene with police officers maintaining order and assisting with ballots.  Expecting to have 
to pay a bribe to vote, she offered a policeman 10,000 leones ($3.40), several day’s 
average wages, which he refused.  “He told me very clearly that he would accept 
nothing…I think the police have changed. They are our police now.”151 
D. JUDICIAL SECTOR/ COURTS 
Sierra Leone continues to operate under a bifurcated legal system that is divided 
into the formal system, based both on English common law, and informal customary law.  
The formal sector is currently comprised of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the 
High Court of Justice, and 12 local magistrate courts, among which 5 of the magistrates 
rotate. The informal sector is compromised of 315 local courts, which apply customary 
law, presided over by local chairmen who consult with formal sector court officials.152  
Customary law is also implemented by paramount chiefs, which although not recognized 
in the constitution comprise the most accessible part of the justice sector for the majority 
of Sierra Leoneans.153  Local courts and chiefs manage approximately 85% of civil 
                                                 
149 Edmond Sylvester Alpha. Role Of Security Agencies In The Conduct Of the 2007 Presidential and 
Parliamentary Elections, 10. 
150 Amnesty International report 2005- Sierra Leone; Amnesty International. Amnesty International 
report 2007- Sierra Leone.  
151 Quoted in: United Kingdom. Department for International Development. UKAID. Development in 
the Republic of Sierra Leone 2009-2012- Country Plan. London: DFID, 2008, 11. 
152 Edward Sawyer, "Remove or Reform? A Case for (Restructuring) Chiefdom Governance in Post-
Conflict Sierra Leone," African Affairs 107, no. 428 (2008): 393–395; "Sierra Leone (12/09)." U.S. 
Department of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm (accessed February 12, 2010). 
153 Sawyer, "Remove or Reform? A Case for (Restructuring) Chiefdom Governance in Post-Conflict 
Sierra Leone," 393–395. 
 37
cases.154  One chief in the Bo district asserts that there is a “general ignorance of legal 
matters,” while another maintains that people “come to the Native Authority court 
because they have no respect for the [state] authorities. If people are not satisfied [with 
the verdict of the court], they go to the police.”155  However, since SSR has focused on 
the formal sector, the following analysis is limited to that sector.   
The capacity of the formal judicial sector, like that of the police, is limited.  As of 
2009, there were 19 magistrates and 13 prosecution lawyers to serve the country.156  
Magistrates are understaffed, lengthy delays to trials and slow appeals processes are 
common, defendants often lack legal representation and prisons are overcrowded with 
poor living conditions.157  There is a shortage of trained judges and staff at the local 
magistrate courts, and many clerks are owed significant amounts of back pay.  
Insufficient infrastructure is also a major problem.  The SLP maintains that the lack of 
capacity in the judicial sector hampers their efforts to combat crime, as the system cannot 
process or obtain convictions against the criminals they arrest.158  The World Bank notes 
that significant progress has been made in building courtrooms and other facilities, but 
primarily in the major urban areas, leaving most of the magistrate courts with poor 
facilities.159  In one case, eleven defendants convicted of treason in January 2005 had 
their appeal heard only in April 2008.  While the appeals court overturned their 
convictions, the men were not released for another seven months.  In another instance, a 
group of soldiers held without trial for four years were released in 2004, only after 
several had died in prison due to maltreatment and medical neglect.160  
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The judicial sector also suffers from political inference.  In 2005, for instance, the 
Minister of Justice refused to file charges against three men accused of beating a 
newspaper editor to death.  In other cases of press intimidation, however, the court 
released without charge Sarh Musa Yamba, the editor of the Concord Times, who had 
been arrested on the orders of the attorney general.  Prior to the 2007 election, several 
political opponents, including Charles Margai of the newly formed People’s Movement 
for Democratic Change (PMDC), were arrested and held.161  This anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the courts strive to maintain their independence but do not always 
succeed.162 
Freedom House’s 2009 assessment gives a clear concise report, stating in part: 
The judiciary has demonstrated a degree of independence, and a number 
of trials have been free and fair. However, corruption, poor salaries, and a 
lack of resources threaten to impede the courts’ future effectiveness… 
Arbitrary arrests are common, as are lengthy pretrial detentions under 
harsh conditions. The local human rights organization Prison Watch 
reported in February 2008 that nearly half of all inmates had not yet been 
sentenced. 163 
E. CONCLUSION 
The entire security sector has demonstrated basic levels of capability, but also 
suffers from gaps in capability.  While political interference in the judiciary is a concern, 
it, the SLP and RSLAF have demonstrated a desire to act in a non-political manner.  The 
RSLAF deployment to UNAMID should be considered a good first step in building a 
competent peacekeeping force, but is still in its infancy. The inability to meet stated goals 
in force reduction demonstrates a lack of ability to manage internal reforms.  While 
individual officers have shown signs of politicization, overall the force has not acted in a 
politically biased manner. The police, while performing well in the 2007 elections are 
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facing troubles policing the cities.  Investigations into rape and drug trafficking also show 
that the SLP have a limited ability to perform these functions, but they are overwhelmed 
and are largely unable to properly investigate and produce charges. There is no sign that 
the government has used the police or military to forcibly suppress political dissidents, 
but they have attempted to use the judiciary to shut out political opponents.  The 
overwhelming reliance on the informal justice sector means that the majority of the 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. OVERVIEW 
This concluding chapter will be divided into two sections.  Section one is a 
comparative analysis of the pre-conflict and post-security sector reform eras.  The 
findings of this comparative analysis are used to evaluate the success of the SSR efforts 
in Sierra Leone in section two.  The chapter concludes with recommendations for future 
post-conflict security sector building programs. 
B. SECTION I: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. Military 
The contemporary RSLAF has significantly broader capabilities and is less 
politicized than the SLA of the 1970s.  In addition to the legacy missions of maintaining 
internal order and supporting the police, the RSLAF has added the abilities to deploy in 
support of peacekeeping missions and is incorporating itself into the regional security 
structure. The ability of the RSLAF to meet UN standards for peacekeeping deployments, 
while not an indicator of an ability to conduct high tempo operations, shows that the 
military has been able to demonstrate its ability to meet minimum requirements and to 
operate with multi-national forces.  The navy also represents a new capability, having 
demonstrated effectiveness in controlling smuggling and illegal fishing in Sierra Leone’s 
territorial waters, capabilities that were absence in its 1970s counterpart.  Given that the 
current navy has less than two hundred more personnel than its earlier incarnation, and 
still less than three hundred overall, this can be considered one of the SSR programs 
biggest successes.  That said, the navy is still underequipped and manned given the 
several hundred miles of coastline.  Further, while the navy was able to respond to ferry 
accidents, there remains a need to fully develop a maritime disaster warning system to 
increase the effectiveness of its response to like incidents. 
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The conduct of the armed forces in supporting the police was comparable in the 
prelude to the 1967 and 2007 national elections: it performed its duties with restraint and 
in a generally non-political manner.  Both militaries demonstrated the capability and 
willingness to operate under the limitations imposed by the civilian government during 
the run up to the elections, and in both cases the incumbent government lost the election.  
The responses to the outcome of the elections could hardly have been more different.  In 
1967 senior officers, midlevel officers, and enlisted soldiers each conducted successful 
coups d’état, as the SLA came apart at its organizational seams attempting to determine 
the make-up of the post-election government. In 2007 there was a peaceful turnover of 
power, with the military remaining in their barracks and not interfering in the process.  
The RSLAF remained loyal to the state and the government of the day. So far the RSLAF 
has been able to keep itself out of the political sphere, in stark contrast to SLA of 1967-
1971.  This performance in the elections notwithstanding, the 2009 Jane’s assessment of 
weak state control over the security forces and the 2009 “DREAM TEAM” letter suggest 
worrying parallels between the RSLAF and SLA in terms of the nature of civilian control 
of the military. These indicate that some part of the RSLAF, perhaps small, is unhappy 
with the management of the President and Minister of Defense, and prepared to threaten 
direct intervention in politics to redressed perceived ethnic favoritism and generalized 
neglect.  This does not bode well for the consolidation democracy in general, or 
democratic civilian control of the military in particular. 
The RSLAF and SLA demonstrate similar capabilities to cope with public unrest 
when called upon to assist the police.  Nevertheless, the RSLAF provides support under 
the MACP, which distinguishes it from the joint army-police units of the 1970s. The 
MACP clearly places the military under civilian control and lays out the limited 
situations under which the army may assist the police or other civilian agencies.  
However, military involvement in smuggling, internal dissent within the ranks, and levels 
of corruption are also similar for the two armed forces.  The RSLAF’s inability to stop 
smuggling or reduce high rates of violent crime parallel the legacy force and suggest that 
the military doesn’t bring effective training and capability, so much as “boots on the 
ground” to the anti-smuggling and crime efforts.  
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The current size of the military (approx 10,000) is three to four times that of the 
SLA, and the government has made no progress toward its stated goals of downsizing the 
force. Although the military’s share of GDP is larger than its counterparts in the region, 
the government has still been unable (or unwilling) to provide proper equipment and 
barracks for the military, as was the case with the SLA.  The size of the present force 
does not mirror its capabilities or what is required for the region.  The lack of resources 
and dedicated missions harkens back to the 1970s, suggesting that military corruption and 
the threat to civilian governance remains.  The much larger size of the contemporary 
military may mean that threat is also larger.   
2. Police 
The police of the 1970s and the 2000s have similar capabilities in dealing with 
crime and public disturbances, their core mission.  Effectiveness was marginal in both 
decades. The police have largely returned to their previous status as an apolitical force, 
but still suffer from corruption and a lack of capacity.  Police reliance on RSLAF 
assistance through MACP indicates a distinct lack of capability in combating crime and is 
directly comparable to the joint police-army units in the 1970s. The SLP has reacted to 
public disturbances and riots in recent years somewhat more professionally than in the 
1970s.  Although there was an incident of police firing into a crowd in 2009, overall the 
post-conflict police have demonstrated more restraint than in the 1970s.  However, recent 
riots have also demonstrated the limitations of the SLP in dealing with crowd control and 
show that they have much room for improvement, much as in the 1970s.  The same can 
be said for efforts in both anti-smuggling and illegal mining.  Neither the past, nor current 
SLP has been able to effectively combat smuggling or illegal diamond mining.  
The current police force is less politicized that that of the 1970s.  There is no 
current counterpart to the highly politicized ISU and GSU, and the rest of the force 
appears to be largely apolitical.  However, the current SLP suffers from significant levels 
of corruption, and a lack of public confidence.  Available data on these issues for the 
1970s is less precise, but if contemporary scholarly assessments are to be taken at face 
value, the SLP has lost ground since the 1970s. 
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Performance of the police in the 1967 and 2007 general elections was broadly 
comparable, with performance slightly better in 2007.  In both elections, the police took 
the lead in providing election security and maintenance of civil order, with the military 
providing support.  While the Dove-Edwin commission lists several shortfalls of the 
police during the prelude to the elections, the incidents documented were limited in both 
scope and number and overall the police actions seem professional and largely apolitical.  
The same can be said for police effectiveness in the 2007 elections, based on the NEC 
and other reports.  In both cases, police appeared to be largely apolitical, overseeing free 
and fair elections in which incumbents were defeated. The elections of 2007 were a major 
accomplishment for the police, but overall performance of the SLP is comparable to that 
of the 1970s, with no major improvements, and a worrying lack of capability in dealing 
with crime, smuggling and illegal mining. 
3. Justice Sector 
The state of the current justice sector is also comparable to that of the early 1970s.  
At times it asserts its independence, but suffers from a lack of capacity, both in personnel 
(court officials, judges and barristers) and infrastructure (poor prison conditions and 
buildings), as in the 1970s.  The courts have been able to process some high profile cases, 
but are unable to conduct timely proceedings for most accused criminals and has been 
cited by the police as a limiting factor in their ability to combat crime.  The court, both in 
the 1970s and presently has been able to carry out trials and render judgments that have 
been acknowledged by the international community to have been fair and impartial.  
While the court by the late 1970s had been brought to heel by the Stevens’ 
administration, the court today more closely resembles its counterpart of the first half of 
the 1970s, during which it was largely able to assert its independence, despite 
interference.   
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C. SECTION II: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Overall Effectiveness of Security Sector Reform 
Measured against the UK’s goals for security sector reform outlined in Chapter I, 
SSR in Sierra Leone has not been successful.  The goals were to build strong institutions 
and security organizations that operated under democratic control with public 
accountability and strong judicial systems.  Of the three parts of the security sector 
examined, the RSLAF has made the greatest gains, and has acquired capabilities that it 
did not possess in the 1970s, but still faces governance challenges.  It is impossible to 
assess the benefits of SSR precisely, since assessment requires counterfactual 
assumptions about what the RSLAF would look like today in the absence of SSR.  It is 
fairly safe to assume that with the war over, the military would have returned to its 
prewar state, especially if we assume aid and training programs generally included in a 
traditional UN peacekeeping operation.  Thus, if the benefits of SSR are measured by the 
improvement of the post-war current security sector over the pre-war security sector, they 
are limited.  Weak civilian control noted by Jane’s and dissatisfaction with civilian 
authority suggested by the DREAM Team letter are exactly what SSR was supposed to 
prevent. The MACP is a positive example of police-military cooperation under civilian 
authority and a success in that it institutionalized the RSLAF’s secondary mission of 
providing for internal stability, while remaining under democratic control.  While the 
RSLAF has performed its MACP duties in a non-political manner to date, a return to the 
military instability of the 1970s cannot be ruled out. The RSLAF’s dedication to the 
MACP program and the increased international and regional support for civilian electoral 
(if not necessarily democratic) regimes mitigate, but do not eliminate, the likelihood of 
increased military intervention in politics.164  Still, the existing weaknesses in civilian 
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control suggest that the SSR program largely failed to establish strong institutional 
control over the military, despite partial success in building military readiness.   
In contrast, SSR in the police and justice sectors has had partial successes in 
institutionalizing accountability while largely failing in capability building.  Both sectors 
are undermanned, lack capability to deal with increasing crime, and are riddled by 
corruption.  However, the continuing need for RSLAF support indicates that SSR did not 
created sufficient capacity within the police force.  The continuing shortage of prisons 
that meet basic standards, attacks by police on the press, charges brought on behalf of the 
ruling party against political opponents, and the minimal presence of the formal justice 
sector outside major urban areas are all shortcomings that SSR was supposed to, but did 
not, address.   
The apolitical performance of the SLP, while comparable to the 1970s, once again 
simply represents a return to the past.  Considering that the police reform programs were 
the first off the ground, with the police charter and a UK national acting as Inspector 
General of the Police for several years, the continuing lack of improvement in capability 
and endemic corruption make it difficult to ascertain what the benefits were of SSR over 
traditional programs.  The proactive measures the police have been taking to reach out to 
the community can be viewed as a positive outcome from the SSR program, as one of the 
goals was to foster a sense of public confidence in the police, and outreach programs can 
be perceived as attempts at such.  However, the analysis of the 1970s suggests the public 
had confidence in the police, without the need to use outreach programs suggesting that, 
to date, SSR has had difficulty fostering a positive public perception of the police.  
However, corruption and incapacity are problems SSR was supposed to, but did not, 
address.   
Similarly, while maintaining significant independence, the courts today face 
political interference and lack capacity, much as they did in the 1970s.  The number of 
magistrates and barristers is almost exactly the same as it was 40 years ago, while 
population size has doubled.  Although the customary courts are recognized in the 
constitution alongside the formal justice sector, the failure of the formal justice sector to 
function outside of urban areas inhibits the spread of the rule of (constitutional) law. This 
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absence also diminishes the effectiveness of elected government and security forces, as it 
encourages citizens to rely on customary structures and creates a distance between them 
and their (national) government.  The lack of capacity in the judiciary continues to 
impede criminal prosecutions, while government interference inhibits the conduct routine 
business and fosters popular perceptions that the courts are politically compromised and 
thus do not represent the people of the country or uphold the rule of law. Overall, the 
benefits of SSR to the judicial sector are minimal at best. 
The British government estimated at the outset that complete SSR reform would 
take 10–50 years.  Only ten have passed.  Justice sector reform is ongoing, as are police 
and military training programs.  However, the SSR program as a whole seems to have 
lost much of its urgency and intensity.  While the international community is still 
involved in Sierra Leone, as evidenced by the continued, but smaller IMATT 
contribution, and Justice Sector development programs, this may be due to the transition 
to the Sierra Leone government the responsibility for maintaining and building on the 
reforms. This would be indicative of a lack of capacity or will at that level to maintaining 
the intensity and focus of SSR. In addition, and perhaps as a result, the most successful 
elements of SSR to date (building military capability under IMATT, and police 
commitment to civilian governance under the White Paper and the British Inspector 
General of the Police) are those that were the first to be undertaken.  Thus, the level and 
nature of the gains to SSR are similar to those achieved by less ambition traditional post-
conflict peacekeeping models elsewhere (e.g., Mozambique).165  
In light of the conclusion that SSR was not successful, this paper cannot 
recommend implementing SSR in future post-conflict states and instead to implement 
traditional stabilization programs that are not as intrusive.   SSR does not focus on the 
underlying causes of conflict.  Even with its focus on civilian governance, it primarily 
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serves to strengthen the security sector creating, as in Sierra Leone, just as much room for 
coups and corruption as it does security for the population.  Of the factors that Fischer 
lists which are common in relatively successful post-conflict states, such as Mozambique 
and Lebanon, the stated goals of SSR meet only one.  Most of the rest require internal 
ownership by the host nation.  In that light, the international community is quite limited 
in the positive contributions that it can make, other than providing specific support that 
the host nation requests.  
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